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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now well known that there are conditions under which mixed
strategy equilibria exist in n-person games where players have payoff
functions that are neither quasiconcave nor continuous. For the most part,
analyses of these equilibria have focused either on general conditions for
existence, as in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) and Simon (1987), or on
the derivation of particular symmetric equilibrium mixed strategies, as in
Varian (1980). To date, a complete characterization of equilibria in this
class of n-person games has not been addressed.'
Our initial goal in starting the present line of research was to investigate
uniqueness of equilibrium in a wide class of games of this type. It turns
out, however, that the question appears to be complex and model specific.
Thus, in this paper, we focus exclusively on Varian's (1980) seminal model
of sales. While this may seem particularly restrictive, many economic
problems, such as the "all-pay auction game,"Z have a similar struciure.
The principal result of this paper is that, when there are more than two
firms in the Varian model of sales, there exist a coniinuum of ásymmetric
equilibria and a unique symmetric equilibrium. This contrasts sharply with
the 2-firm game in which the unique equilibrium is the symmetric one.
Despité the multiplicity of equilibria, in all equilibria at least two agents
randomize continuously over the union of the supports of the equilibrium
price distributions, just as in the 2-firm game. We call this the two-to-tango
property.
While the set of equilibria in the Varian model of sales is large, we show
that all the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed strategies that can be ranked
by first-order stochastic dominance. This ordering enables us to construct
a metagame in which both firms and consumers are players and in which
asymmetric equilibria are ruled out as subgame perfect equilibria. Intu-
itively, the asymmetric strategies are not consistent with price dispersion
~ For particular two-person games, such as the War of Attrition (Hendricks, Weiss and
Wilson, 1988), capacity-constrained price setting games (Osborne and Pitchik, 1986a), and
price setting with loyal consumers (Narasimhan, 1988), uniqueness has been thoroughly
examined. Osborne and Pitchik (1986b) also examine the question of uniqueness in the 3-
firm "pure" location model of Hotelling (1929). They show that with a uniform distribution
of consumers, in addition to a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (sce Shaked, 1982),
there is a unique (up to symmetry) asymmetric equilibrium within the class of equilibria in
which at least one firm uses a pure strategy.
- The all-pay auction game is as follows: n players simultaneously bid for the right to buy
a prize worth V; to player i. All players forfeit their bid, and the person submitting the highest
bid wins the prize. Moulin (1986) characterizes the symmetric equilíbrium of the game when
V; - 1 Vr. This equilibrium involves mixed strategies that are the mirror image of the mixcd
strategies set forth in Varian (1980). In Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1990), we characterize
all equilibria for the all-pay auction game.
EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF SALES 495
because they imply that distributions of prices charged by some firms
stochastically dominate those charged by other firms.3
II. TrtE MoDEL
Following Varian (1980), consider a market where n? 2 firms produce
a homogeneous product with an identical technology exhibiting weakly
declining average cost.' The cost curve of each firm is denoted c(q), where
q is quantity produced. We assume ihat there are a large number of
consumers, each of whom will purchase one unit of the good if faced with
a price less than or equal to a reservation value r, and none of the good if
faced with a price greater than r. There are two types of consumers:
informed and uninformed. Informed consumers purchase a unit of the
good from the store charging the lowest price, as long as this price is below
the reservation value. Each uninformed consumer is aware of the price at
one firm only, and purchases from that firm if the price is no greater than
r. We assume that the same number, U, of uninformed consumers shop
at each store, and that rU - c(U) ) O.S The total number of informed
consumers is 1.
Firms are assumed to set prices simultaneously. Let (p,, ..., p„) be
the vector of prices charged by the firms, and define p-; to be the minimum
price charged by any firm other than i, and m-; to be the number of firms
charging p-;. Then firm i's profit is given by
P;(! t U) - c(I f U) if p; c p-; and p; ~ r
P; I ~ t U~ - c I 1 t U~ if p; - p-; s r`m -; `m -;
n,(Pi, . . . ,P,~ -
P;U- c( U) if P-; c P; ~ r
0 if p;1 r.
Thus, if a firm does not set the lowest price, it services only the U
uninformed consumers who shop at the store. If a firm sets the lowest
price, it services all of the informed consumers plus the U uninformed
~ An important by-product ofour analysis of this metagame is that we genera(ize the model
of Narasimhan (1988) from 2 órtns to n firms.
~ To focus on essentials, we ignore the entry decision and view n as fixed. Varian assumes
strictly declining average cost in order to pin down the equilibrium number of firms when
there is free entry.
s See Bagnoli (1986) for a discussion of the importance of this assumption.
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consumers who shop at the store. In the event several firms tie in charging
the lowest price, they share the informed consumers equally.
Varian shows in his Proposition 2 that there is no equilibrium where all
firms charge the same price. In a sequence of propositions, he derives the
symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to the game. In the following
section we expand the scope of analysis to determine whether there exist
asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria.
III. THE FULL SET OF EQUILIBRIA
ln the normal form of the above game, firm i's strategy is p; E[0, x) and
its payoff function is II;(p~, ..., p„), i- 1, ..., n. The complete set of
Nash equilibria will be derived in a series of lemmas. In what follows we
define
rU f c(I f U) - c(U)
p- IfU '
(D.1)
i.e., the price at which a firm selling to both its uninformed consumers and
the informed consumers obtains the same profit that it would obtain by
charging the reservation price r and selling only to its uninformed consum-
ers. A price below p is strictly dominated by setting r.
Let s; and s; denote the lower and upper bounds of firm i's equilibrium
price distribution G;. When s; - s;, firm i adopts a pure strategy; otherwise
it employs a mixed strategy. Let a; denote the size of a mass point in i's
distribution.
One equilibrium of this game, a symmetric equilibrium, has been ana-
lyzed by Varian (1980).6 Our main result, summarized in the following
theorem, is that there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria as well.
THEORÉi~t 1. The Varian model ofsales possesses two types of equilib-
ria. Either all firms use the same continuous mixed strategy with support
[ p, r] , or at least two firms randomize ouer [ p, r], with each otherftrm i
rándomizing over [ p, x;), x; c r, and havingá mass point at r equal to
(1 - G,{x;)).~ When two or more ,firms haue a positive density ouer a
common interual they play the same (continuous) mixed strategy ouer that
interual.
6 After this paper was completed, it was brought to our attention that BagnoG ( 1986) found
a 5nite number of asymmetric equilibria (see Example 2 below).
~ We could have s; ~ p, in which case the interval [ p, z;) is empty and firm i places all
mass at r. - -
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To prove the theorem we need a sequence of lemmas.
LEMMAI. Hir?s;?S;?p10.
Proof. By setting p; - r each firm can guarantee itself at least rU -
c(U). This rules out prices greater than r, at which firms earn zero. For
prices less than p, II; c p(1 t U) - c(I t U) - rU - c(U). Hence, a
firm will never pnce below p, as more could be earned by charging r. ~
LEMMA 2. If 31, j s.t. s; ~ s~ and a;(s~) - 0 then s~ - r. If s; c s; limyt,
G~ (p) - G~ (s;). !f in addition a;(s;) - 0 then limp t, G~{p) - Iimo t 5. G~{ p).
Proof. Ih (s~, G-~) - s~ U- c(U) c rU - c(U) for s~ c r. Since the
same holds for II;(p, G-~) for p ~ s; and p- s; if a;(s;) - 0, the claim
follows. ~
LEMMA 3. !f s, - . - . - s,„ G s,,,t ~ , . . . , s„ for n ? m ? 2 then
3 i ~ m such that a;(s;) - 0.
Proof. Suppose not. Then any i ~ m has an incentive to undercut s; by
small e 7 0. ~
LEMMA 4. If s~ -..~- sm e Sm}~, ..., s„ for n ? m? 2 then
s;-rtl;.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 2 and 3. ~
LEMMA S. There exists no ftrm i such that s; c s~ dj ~ i.
Proof. Suppose such a firm did exist. If a;(s;) - 0, from Lemma 2
limpt, G~(p) - limots; G~(p), b'j ~ i, which implies that II;(s;, G-;) c
llmP t, II;(p, G-;). If the claim held and a;(s;) ~ 0 then dj ~ i a~(s;) - 0,
which implies that limP t, G;(p) - limo t s; G;( p), leading to a similar contra-
díction. ~
LEMMA 6. s; - r b~i.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 4 and 5. ~
Let II ~` represent the equilibrium profit of firm i- 1, ..., n. Then we
have:
LEMMA 7. I~I;` - II~ tÍi~j.
Proof. Without loss of generality suppose II;` c II; . With s~ being the
lower bound ofj's support, II' c II; - II~L~, G-;) s limD tS~ II;(p;, G-;),
a contradiction. ~
LE~tMA 8. II! - rU - c(U) bi.
Proof. If a,{s;) - 0 b~i we are through. If 3j such that a~(s~) ~ 0 then
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II; - rU - c( U) from Lemmas 3 and 6, and with firms earning equal
profit from Lemma 7, II;` - rU - c(U) di. r.
LEMMA 9. ~l, j such that s; - sj - p.
Proof. Suppose not. Let s; be the second lowest s. Then the lowest s
firm can set a price p slightly below s; and earn TI; - p(1 f U) - c(1 f
U) ~ II ~`. r.
The previous nine lemmas establish that s; - r di; there exist two i's,
say i- i, Z, such that s i - s, - p ; and II ` - rU - c( U) di. We now
proceed to pin down the equilibrium distributions. Let W(p) - p( U f 1)
- c(U -t- I), L(p) - pU - c(U),
n ~
A; - ~ (1 - Gj), and A;j - ~ (1 - Gk).
j-~ k~l
j,~; kfj,i
LEMMA 10. There are no point masses on the half open interval
[P~ r).
-Proof Suppose one of the cumulative distribution functions, say G;,
has a mass point at p;. Since b~p E[p, r), (1 - G;)A;j 7 0, (1 - G;)A~ has
a downward jump at p;, Vj ~ i. This follows directly from the monotonicity
of the c.d.f.'s. For p; 1 p this implies that it is worthwhile forj to transfer
all mass from an s-neighborhood above p; to some S-neighborhood below
p;. At p; - p it pays forj to transfer mass from an e-neighborhood above
p; to r. Thus, there would be an s-neighborhood above p; in which no other
firm j would put mass. But then it cannot be an equilibrium strategy for
player i to put mass at p;. ~
Lemma 11 is a generalization of Varian's Proposition 4.
LEMMA. I1. The integrand
B~{P;) - W(Pi)At(Pr) } L(Pi)(1 - A,{Pr)) (D.2)
is constant and equal to rU - c(U) at the points of increase of G; in the
half open inlerval [ p, r) for all i.
Proof. By Lemma 10 there are no point masses in the interval. Thus,
B,{p;) is the expected profit of firm i from setting p; E [ p, r). Ifp; is a point
of increase of G; then firm i must make its equilibrium profit at p;. t.
LEMMA 12. Suppose p is a point of increase of G; and G~ in [ p, r).
Then G; - G~ at p.
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Proof. B,{p) - B~(p) - rU - c(U). From (D.2) we have
W(P)A~(P)(1 - G~(P)) f L(P)(1 - A~(P)(1 - G~(P))) - rU - c(U).
This implies that
A~(P)(1 - G~(P)) -
rU - c(U) - L(p) - ,q~r(P)(1 - G(P)).
W(P) - L(P)
Division by AU(p) - A~;(p) 1 0 gives G~(p) - G;(p). t.
LEMMA 13. For euery i and every point of increase p of G; in [ p, r)
there is at least one G~ j~ i such that G~ is increasing at p. -
Proof. Because B;(p) is constant in a half-open neighborhood about
p by Lemma 11, dB;(p) - 0. Suppose contrary to the hypothesis that
dA;(p) - 0. Totally differentiating B;(p) gives
A;dWf (1 -A;)dL-O.
However, both dW and dL are positive and A;(p) E(0, 1]. Hence for dB;(p)
to be zero dA; is necessarily negative. By the monotonicity of the G;'s at
least one has to increase. t.
LEMMA 14. If G; is strictly increasing on some open subset (x, y),
p G x C y C r, then G; is strictly increasing on the whole interual [ p, y).
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose, to the contrary, that G;
were constant on (z, x), p ~ z c x. Then from Lemma 10, G;(z) - G;(z).
It is evident that there ezlsts an e~ 0 such that on the interval (x - e, x)
there exist at least two firms, say ! and m, with strictly increasing c.d.f.'s
over the interval (otherwise mass would be moved up to x by some firm).
Thus, for every p E(x - e, x), B~(p) - B,,,(p) - rU - c( U). Furthermore,
since there are no mass points in the interval [ p, r), B~(x) - Bm(x) -
B,{z) - rU - c( U) which, from arguments similar to those used in proving
Lemma 12, implies that G;(x) - Gm(z) - G;(x) c 1. But with
B,{z) - B~(x) - B;(p) b~p E(x - e, x)
it must be that B,{p) ~ B;(p) dp E ( x - e, z), since such values of p do
not lie in i's support. This implies that A,(p) ? A;(p), and hence that 1-
G,(p) ? 1- G;(p). This is a contradiction to the fact that G;(x) - Gi(x),
G;(p) is increasing on (x - e, x) and G,(p) is cons[ant on (z - E, x). r.
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LEMMA l5. (It Takes Two to Tango). At least two firms randomize
continuously on [ p, r].
Proof. Three cases are possible at r: (i) all firms allocate positive mass
at r, ( ii) all firms have G,{x;) - 1 at some x; c r, or ( iii) there is at least one
firm i that has a positive left-derivative of G; at r. Cases ( i) and (ii) are
easily ruled out by previous lemmas. Lemmas 12, 13, and 14 then imply
that there are at least two firms that randomize continuously over [ p,
r]. ~
LEMMA 16. Once G; is constant on a subset (x, y), p ~ x c y c r, it
is constant on (x, r) and has a mass point at r. -
Proof. The first part is a direct implication of Lemma 14. The second
part follows from Lemma 6. ~
The above lemmas together establish our Theorem 1.
Note that in the case where n - 2, Lemmas 12 and 15 and Theorem 1
imply that the equilibrium of Varian's model of sales is unique and symmet-
ric. This illustrates an important property that appears to have implications
for other games with discontinuous payoffs. The 2-person game may have
a unique equilibrium but the n-person game does not. In 2-person games,
in order to make one player indifferent between all pure strategies in its
support, the other player's strategy is uniquely determined. I"n n-player
games this is generally not true.e
Exact expressions for the equilibrium distributions may be obtained
recursively over the interval [ p, r], conditional on the points at which
firms stop randomizing continuóusly and move remaining mass to r. These
expressions are provided in Appendix A. Here we give some instructive
examples.
EXAMPLE 1. Symmetric Equilibrium (Varian, 1980). From the proof
of Lemma 12, for n? 2 the symmetric strategies are
(r - p)U vc~-p
1- G- [Ip - c(I f U) f c( U) ~
In this case, all firms randomize continuously on the interval [p, r], and
use the same strategy. -
ExAMPLE 2. Pure and Mixed Strategies (Bagnoli, 1986). Completely
~ Our result thus serves as yct another warning against the common practice ofeztrapolat-
ing from 2 to rt.
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asymmetric strategies arise when k? 2 firms randomize over [ p, r] and
n- k firms load all mass at r. The respective strategies are -
(r - p)U uck-i~
1- G; - Ip - c(I t U) t c( U)]






ExAMPLE 3. Intermediate Asymmetric Strategies. The finál example
is a situation where two or more firms randomize over [ p, r], and other
6rms randomize over proper subsets [ p, x~], p s x~ c r.In the case of
three firms with strategies H, G, and F, an example ofthe Nash equilibrium
strategies is
where
1 - H(x) -
(r - p) U in
Ip - c(I f U) f c(U)]
for p E[ p, x]
(r - p)U (1 - H(x))-iIp - c(I t U) t c( U)]
for p E [x, r]
( l- H(x) for p E[z, r)
jl0 forp-r,
(r - x) U ~n
Ix - c(I f U) f c( U)] ~
Note that H, G, and F have a kink at x, but not a jump.
To conclude, there are an uncountable infinity of payoff-equivalent
equilíbrium mixed strategies.
IV. ORDERING THE ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIES
In this section we show that the asymmetric equilibria imply mixed
strategies that can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance. This
result will be used in Section V to motivate the symmetric equilibrium as
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a"reasonable" equilibrium selection by constructing a metagame in which
ít is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
DEFINITION 1. Let F and G be two cumulative distribution functions.
F is said to strictly first-order stochastically dominate G if f~x dF ~
f`, dG for all t, wiih strict inequality holding for some t.
TxeoREM 2. If, in a Nash equilibrium, firm i has a larger mass point
at r t{tan firm j, then the distribution of prices charged by firm i strictly
first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of prices charged by
firm j. If two firms load the same mass at r, then their price distributions
are stochasticaliy equiualent (i.e., G;(p) - G~(p) Hp).
Proof. Let (Gi, ..., G„) be Nash equilibrium mixed sirategies, and
suppose that firm i loads more mass at r than some firmj. Then by Theorem
1, associated with firms i and j are x;'s and x~'s with x; c x~ such that firm
i randomizes continuously on [ p, x;) and loads remaining mass at r, while
firm j randomizes continuously on [ p, x~) and loads any remaining mass
at r. Ifx; - p, firm i loads all mass at rand hence the proposition is trivially
proved. -
Hence, suppose p c x; c x~. Then G; and G~ are both strictly increas-
ing for p E [ p, x;), ánd Lemma 12 reveals that G; - G~ on [ p, x;). Hence
G;(p) - G~(p~} for p E[ p, x;]; G,(p) c G~(p) for p E(x;, r)ánd G;(r) -
G;(r). That is, G;(p) strictly first-order stochastically dominates G;(p).
If the two firms load the same mass at r, then Theorem 1 implies that
the firms randomize on the same interval, say [ p, x), and load remaining
mass at r. Lemma 12 thus implies that the firms í~ave identical distribution
funciions, so that their strategies are stochastically equivalent. ~
The basic idea behind Theorem 2 is depicted in Fig. 1 for the case when
n- 3. Here, firms 2 and 3 randomize continuously on the interval [p, rJ,
while firm 1 randomizes continuously on the interval [ p, xi) and lóads
mass at r(see Example 3). On the interval [ p, x,) all three firms are equally
likely to charge low prices. On the interval [xi, r], firms 2 and 3 are equally
likely to charge low prices, but firms 2 and 3 charge lower prices than firm
1 with probability one, since all of its mass in the interval is at r. Hence,
G~(p) ~ Gz(p) - G3(p) for all p, with strict inequality holding for p E
(x~, r).
V. RECONSIDERING THE SYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM
An importanl observation by Varian is that most models of price disper-
sion imply that some stores consistently charge (ower prices than other
stores. Varian argues that if price dispersion is to be an equilibrium phe-
nomenon, it must be temporal in nature. According to Varian:
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Ftc. 1. Stochastic dominance. The figure is drawn on the presumption that U ~ I. This
guarantees G" ~ 0 for n~ 2, while G" ~ 0 necessarily for n- 2.
In a market exhibiting temporal price dispersion, we would see each store
varying its price over time. At any moment, a cross section of the market would
exhibit price dispersion; but because of the intentional Huctuations in price,
consumers cannot learn from experience about stores that consistently have
low prices, and hence price dispersion may be expected to persis[. (p. 65l)
While these arguments are intuitively plausible, the Varian game is a one-
shot game,9 and hence the appeal to learning over time as a disciplining
device is really outside of the model. The idea behind learning is to allow
the consumers to infer the strategies used by the firms. In games with
complete information, players know who their opponents are. Hence by
considering Nash equilibria in a game ofcomplete information, one circum-
vents the "learning" story; one simply asks if, given the strategies of the
other players, any player has an incentive to deviate. Nash theory says
nothing about how agents learn the strategies of opponents, although it
does make a nice story. For this reason we offer an extensive form of the
Varian game that is consistent with the spirit of Varian's arguments.
Suppose the n firms and M- n U uninformed consumers move simulta-
neously, the firms choosing their equilibrium price distributions and the
uninformed consumers each deciding the identity of the firm to which they
will go to make a purchase decision. After the firms and uninformed
consumers have moved (the firms having set prices and the uninformed
9 By Lemma 8 there is a unique Nash equilibrium payoff to the game. Hence, if the game
is repeated finitely many times, the firms cannot "cooperate" to improve their payoffs, and
it thus makes sense to think of the Varian game being repeated some large (but finite) number
of times.
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having chosen to which firm to go), the informed consumers decide simul-
taneously from which, if any, firm to purchase. For simplicity, we assume
that c(q) is zero.'o
We now establish
TttEOREM 3. The unique subgame perfect eqt~ilibrium in the extensiue
form sales game is the symmetric equilibrium."
The proof proceeds by several lemmata. Before ihese are stated, some
remarks are in order. Note that the only proper subgames of the game
start at the first node along each of the paths at which an informed con-
sumer must make a decision where to shop. Subgame perfection requires
that all informed consumers buy from one of the firms setting the lowest
price. If the uninformed consumers allocate themselves equally across
firms and the firms do not play the symmetric equilibrium then ihey must
play one of the asymmetric equilibria. By Theorem 2 there will exist some
firm, say firm 1, whose distribution stochastically dominates some other
firm's distribution. This implies that it is not a best response for uninformed
consumers to shop at the first firm,~Z since, on average, they will pay
lower prices by shopping elsewhere. Suppose, then, that the uninformed
consumers do not allocate themselves equally across firms. Let U; be the
number of uninformed consumers allocating themselves to firm i. We deal
first with the case where Ut c UZ c U3 ~... ~ U,,. Degenerate cases
where one of the strict inequalities adjacent to UZ is weak require a separ-
ate analysis. This is carried out in Appendix B.
Let p; - U;rl(I f U;), i- I, ..., n. By assumption p, ~ p, c p3
~''' s p,,. It is easily shown that Lemmas 1 through 6 fróm Section III
hold for this case, where in Lemma 1 we insert p; in place of p in both the
statement and proof, and the proof of Lemma~ is altered in an obvious
fashion. We replace the remaining lemmas of Section III with the lemmas
that follow. Henceforth, let s denote the lower bound of the union of the
supports of the firms' equilibrium price distributions.
LEMMA Í~. S ? pZ.
Proof. Firm i would never put mass below p; since setting price equal
~o We rule out for now mixed strategies on the part of uninformed consumers, although
this does not aft'ect the nature of the outcome because firms care only about the expected
number of uninformed consumers that they serve.
~~ If c(q) were to exhibit sufficiently inereasing returns to scale, i.e., if c(I t M)I(I f M)
G ~ while c(1)II ~ r, there would also be asymmetric equilibria whereby one firm monopolizes
the market. Our assumption that c(q) exhibits constant returns to scale rules out this type
of equilibrium.
'j Note that an uninformed consumer's payoff is linear in ptice, so that such a consumer
will go to a store with the lowest expected price.
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to r strictly dominates such a strategy. Firm 1 clearly has no incentive to
put mass in the interval [ p,, p2). ~
LEMMA 8'. All firms other than firm 1 must place a mass point at r.
Proof. By Lemma 6, s; - r b~i. Since s? p2 ~ p,, firm 1 must have
equilibrium profit II i of at least (I t U,) pz ~rU,.~T'hus, firm 1 cannot
have a mass point at r since, by Lemma 3, some firm must put no mass at
r, in which case firm 1 would be undercut at r with certainty and earn rU,
there. Since II i ~ rU,, in every neighborhood below r firm 1 must undercut
every other firm with positive probability. Thus, every firm but firm 1 must
put a mass point at r. ~
LEMMA 9'. ~di ~ 1 II;` - rU;.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 3 and 8'. ~
LEMMA 10'. s- pZ and si - s2 - p~.
Proof. From Lemma 7' s? p:. Suppose s ~ p,. By undercutting s by
an arbitrarily small amount firm~ could earn arblirarily close to (1 f U~)s
) rUZ - II;`, a contradiction. Thus, s- pZ. The second part of the claim
is straightforward. ~ -
LEMMA 11'. There are no point masses on the half open interual
[P~~ r).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 10, inserting pZ for p, and noting
that if firm 1 has a mass point at p2, firm 2 will move mass up to r, while
if firm 2 has a mass point at p~ firm 1 will move mass slightly below p,. ~
LEMMA 12'. B; (P;) -(1 t U;)p;A;(p;) t U;p;(1 - A,{p;)) is constant
and equal to II;` at the points ofincrease of G; in [ p,, r) for al i. B,{p;) ~
II~` if p; is not a point of increase in [p2, r). -
Proof. Similar to Lemma 11. ~
LEMMA 13'. tlp E( pZ, r) 3ii , iZ such that tls 7 0 G; (p f e) -
Gr (P - e) 1 0, i- i, , iz.
Proof. Immediate. ~
LEMMA 14'. s; - r b~i J 2.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume s~ - min;zj s;. Suppose s, ~
r. Then there exists an initial interval of increase [s3, s3 t s) in which
B~(p) - II3 - U3r -(I f U3)pA3(p) -4- U3p(1 - A3(p)). Thus
U3 - A3(P) r p p1 t1p E[s3, s3 t E).
But since G, and G~ are increasing on [pZ, s3),
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S
UZ - A,(s3) -3 1.-- r-s3
Since for s3 c r: A~(s3) - II;tZ (I - G;(s3)) ~ II;~3 (1 - G~{s~)) - A3(s~)
we have a contradiction to the fact that UZ c U3. Thus, s~ - r. ~
We have thus shown that if U, c UZ c U3 ~'~ ' ~ U„ then firms 1 and
2 will continuously randomize over [ p2, r), with firm 2 having a mass point
at r and all other firms setting price équal to r with probability one. This
cannot comprise a subgame perfect equilibrium because the uninformed
consumers shopping at firms 2 through n would prefer to defect to firm 1,
given the strategies played. While the degenerate cases where UZ - U; -
...- Um, m s n, will generally lead to multiple equilibria, the stochastic
dominance rankings apply, and as long as all the firms are not symmetric
some uninformed consumers would want to defect. This case is covered
in Appendix B.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has derived the complete set of equilibria in Varian's (1980)
model of sales. In addition to the well known symmetric equilibrium,
Theorem 1 reveals the existence of a continuum of asymmetric Nash
equilibrium mixed strategies. While the set of equilibria is thus very large,
Theorem 2 revealed that the set of equilibrium mixed strategies can be
ranked by first-order stochasiic dominance. We then constructed an exten-
sive form of the model which, along with the stochastic dominance rank-
ing, yields Varian's symmetric equilibrium as the unique subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
The basic technology used to characterize the complete set of equilibria
to the sales game may also be used to characterize the full set of equilibria
in other games with discontinuous payoffs. For example, results similar
to those in section III and IV reveal a continuum of equilibrium in the all
pay auction (see Moulin, 1986, or Weber, 1985). A detailed examination
of the implications of the asymmetric equilibria in the all pay auction for
lobbying and patent races is contained in Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries
(1990).
APPENDIX A
The exact expressions for the equilibrium distribution functions in Theo-
rem 1 may be obtained recursively as follows: If we assume, without loss
of generality, that firms 1, ..., m, m ? 2, randomize over [p, r], with
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firms m f 1, . .., n randomizing over [ p, x;), xn ~ xn-, ~.. . s xn,,, c
r, then -
(a) dP E [ P, x~)
(r - p)U v(n-n
1- G'{P) -
Ip - c(1 f U) f c( U)]
(b) For j- n, n- 1, ..., m f 2 and bp E[x~, x~-,)





Ip - c(1 t U) } c( U) k-;
i- 1,..., j- 1
1 - G,{p) - 1 - G;(x;)
(C) dP E[xm t I, r)
i -j,. . .,n.
r (r - p) U ~ urm - n r n1- G,{p) - llp - c(1 f U) f c(U) Lk-~ i(1
- Gk(xk))
1 - G,{p) - 1 - G;(x;)




i- m f 1, . .., n
bi.
This appendix deals with degenerate rankings of U,, ..., Un in the
proof of Theorem 3. We first deal with the case where U, c U. - U3 -
~~~- U,,, c Umt, ~, ..., ~ U„ for some 3 s m s n. It is easily seen
that for this case ihe previously altered versions of Lemmas 1 through 6
hold, as do Lemmas 7' through 9'. Lemmas 11' through 13' also continue
to hold (with an obvious alteration in the labelling of players in the proof
of Lemma I 1'). Lemmas 10' and 14' must be altered ( slightly) as follows;
the proofs require only a minor change in the labelling of players.
LEMMA 10". s- pZ. There exists at least one,firm i, 2 ~ i 5 m, such
that ~ - pZ. - -
LEMMA 14". S; - r b~i ) m.
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lf n 7 m we are through in our proof that such an allocation of consumers
cannot be part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; firms m t 1, ...,
n place all mass at r while other firms place mass below r, which contradicts
the fact that U„ 7 U; b~j s m. .
Suppose then that n- m, so that U~ c UZ - U3 -...- U,,. The
following versions of Lemmas 12 and 14 hold for firms 2, ..., n.
LEMMA 15". Suppose p is a point of increase of G; and G; in [ p2, r] ,
i, j E{2, ..., n}. Then G; - G~ at p.
Proof. Same as proof of Lemma 12. ~
LEMMA 16". If G; , i E{2, ..., n}, is strictly increasing on some open
suóset (x, y), pz c z c y c r, then G; is strictly increasing on the whole
interual [p2, y).
Proof. -Similar to proof of Lemma 14 where one of the firms 1, m
must be an element of {2, ..., n} and this firm is used throughout the
continuation of the proof. ~
Lemma 16", together with Lemmas 10" and 13', imply the following:
LEMMA 17". At least one of the firms 2, ..., n mccst randomize on
the interual [ p~, r].
We are now in a position to show that the indicated allocation of consumers
cannot be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium. To do this we show that
G~ is strictly first-order stochastically dominated by G;, i E{2, ..., n},
LEMMA 18". s~ - pZ, andfor euery price pz G p c r in the support of
G~ , G~(p) ~ G; (p), i É {2, . . . , n}. -
Proof. From Lemma 17" ai least one of the firms 2, ..., n has support
[ p,, r]. Without loss of generality, suppose this is firm 2. From Lemmas
3ánd 8', firm 1 does not have a mass point at r, and from Lemma 11' no
firm has a mass point in [ p2, r). Thus, there exists some point p E( p2, r)
ai which G~(p) is increasing. At any such point -
Bi(P) ~ p,(1 f U~)
sincc the right-hand side is whai firm 1 can obtain by charging p2. Rear-
ranging this expression, we obtain -
Ai(P) ~ [PZ(1 f U~) - PUi]Ipl.
From Lemmas 9' and 12'
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Az(P) - (r - P)Uz~pl.
Recalling that pz - rUZ~(I f U~) we may subtract A~ from A, to obtain
Ai(P) - Az(p) ~ íU2 - U,)(p - Qz)Ipl ~ 0,
where the strict right-hand inequality follows from the assumption that
UZ 7 U, and p 1 pZ. Thus, at any point of increase of G, in the interval
( p2, r), A, ~ AZ. This directly implies that G, ) G, for any such point. But
since GZ has support [ pZ, r] and G, has no mass points, this implies that
S i- pz. Furthermore, since for any other firm i E{2, ..., n} and for any
p E[ pZ, r], GZ(p) ? G;(p), we have the claim. r.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 18" and the fact that G, has no
mass points is that G,(p) ? GZ(p) for every p in [pZ, r], with strict in-
equality on the open interval. This contradicts the ~ct that U, c U~, so
the given allocation of consumers cannot be part of a subgame perfect
equilibrium.13
The remaining cases to be covered, where U, - Uz -...- Um c
Um}, ~ ... s U„ for 2 s m ~ n- 1, require a mixture of the analysis
of the symmetric case and asymmetric case. It can be shown that firms 1
through m may play any m-firm equilibrium of the type outlined in Theorem
l, while firms m t I through n put all mass at r. Since at least two of the
firms among {1 ..., m} put all probability mass below r, this cannot be
a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation of consumers.
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